How Large is the Endowment Effect in the Risky Investment Game?

Stein T. Holden and Mesfin Tilahun

School of Economics and Business, NMBU, Norway

30.08.2021
Richard Thaler (1981) introduced the “Endowment effect” concept and associated it with loss aversion and prospect theory.

Associated with commodity ownership, “Exchange asymmetries”, and the ”WTA-WTP gap”,

Explanations? Loss aversion, status quo bias, default effects, changing reference points, psychological transaction costs

Our experiment is based on the one-shot version of the risky investment game of Gneezy and Potters (1997, first used by Gneezy et al. (2009).

In this game the respondents are free to invest all, some or nothing of an initial monetary endowment that they are allocated where they have 50% chance of winning the tripled amount of their investment or nothing.
Holden and Tilahun (2021) used the game and found significant endowment effects associated with safe versus risky initial amounts provided in the game. They demonstrate this by comparing investment levels when the respondents are endowed with safe and risky initial monetary endowments.
Holden and Tilahun (2021) used the game and found significant endowment effects associated with safe versus risky initial amounts provided in the game.

They demonstrate this by comparing investment levels when the respondents are endowed with safe and risky initial monetary endowments.

In this paper we build on Holden and Tilahun (2021) and investigate the relative size of the endowment effects associated with safe and risky initial monetary endowments.
RQ1. Are the endowment effects of similar size for risky and sure monetary endowments? Or, is the endowment effect stronger for safe than for risky money?

RQ2. How can we explain the dominance of interior choices in the risky investment game?

For RQ1 we need to establish a benchmark treatment that does not invoke any endowment effects. We introduce a new treatment to do this. This is the first contribution of this paper.

Prospect Theory predicts that respondents should invest all or nothing in the game but in reality interior choices dominate. Our second contribution is to provide an alternative theoretical model to explain this empirical regularity.
1. Respondents are given an initial endowment $X$.
2. They can invest a share $0 \leq x/X \leq 1$.
3. They have 50-50 chance of winning $3x$ or 0.
4. **The payouts will be:**
5. The lucky winner: $X - x + 3x = X + 2x$
6. The loser: $X - x$
1. Respondents are given an initial endowment $X$
2. They can invest a share $0 \leq x/X \leq 1$
3. They have 50-50 chance of winning $3x$ or 0
4. **The payouts will be:**
5. The lucky winner: $X - x + 3x = X + 2x$
6. The loser: $X - x$
7. **A risk-neutral person should invest the full amount**
1. Respondents are given an initial endowment $X$.
2. They can invest a share $0 \leq x/X \leq 1$.
3. They have 50-50 chance of winning $3x$ or $0$.
4. The payouts will be:
5. The lucky winner: $X - x + 3x = X + 2x$.
6. The loser: $X - x$.
7. A risk-neutral person should invest the full amount.
8. Does the initial endowment initiate an endowment effect that reduces investment in the game?
Some issues related to the Risky Investment Game

- The game does not distinguish risk-lovers, risk-neutral and slightly risk averse respondents.
- A linear utility function implies a corner solution in the game - all or nothing investments, with loss aversion $> 2$ explaining no investment.
- Interior choices in the game point towards non-linear utility functions that also are concave in the loss domain (contradicts Prospect Theory which assumes convex or linear value function in the loss domain).
Comparative studies with one-shot game: Dominance of interior choices

- Most studies in developing countries use small samples but Dasgupta et al. (2019) applied the game to a large student sample in India (2000 students) and found interior choices to dominate (above 90%).
- Gong and Yang (2012) used the one-shot game to study one matrilineal and one patrilineal society in China with a small sample (N=132). Most females invested nothing in the patrilineal society. 10-30% of the males invested the whole amount and 15-20% invested nothing.
Treatment T2: Full Risk endowment

1. Respondents are endowed with the 50-50 lottery of winning $3X$ or 0.
2. They can sell a share $0 \leq y/3X \leq 1$ back to the researcher.
3. The researcher pays $y/3$ for the lottery amount sold.
4. **The payouts will be:**
   - The lucky winner: $3X - y + y/3 = 3X - 2y/3$
   - The loser retains $y/3$.
Respondents are endowed with the 50-50 lottery of winning $3X$ or 0. They can sell a share $0 \leq y/3X \leq 1$ back to the researcher. The researcher pays $y/3$ for the lottery amount sold.

The payouts will be:

- The lucky winner: $3X - y + y/3 = 3X - 2y/3$
- The loser retains $y/3$

Holden and Tilahun (2021) (HT21) showed that treatment T2 resulted in a substantially higher average investment level than treatment T1. A risky endowment enhances investment in the game but to what extent is this due to an endowment effect for the risky prospect?

HT21 also found that a larger share of the respondents (37%) invest the full amount in treatment T2 than in treatment T1 (10%) - and 58% in T2 and 90% in T1 preferred interior choices.
Respondents are given a sequence of binary choices starting with the choice between an initial 50-50 lottery endowment $3X$ or 0 and $X$ with certainty. They are not allocated any amount till after the completion of all the binary choices, thereby preventing endowment effects. Depending on their choice above, they are given a new binary choice between the preferred choice above and $X/2$ with certainty and 50-50 lottery of getting $3X/2$ or 0. Depending on the choice, further binary choice options are provided to zoom in on the preferred combination of lottery investment and sure amount. The exchange price between lottery and sure amounts is the same as in Treatments T1 and T2.
The AEET models allow for probability weighting like in prospect theory and rank-dependent utility theory. Unlike in prospect theory, the AEET models retain the concave utility in the loss domain.

\[
\max AEET(\text{T1}) = -\delta_s [(u^s(30) - u^s(30 - x)] + [1 - w^+(0.5)]u^r(30 - x) \nonumber \\
+ w^+(0.5)u^r(30 + 2x) \quad (1)
\]

A $\delta_s$ utility weight associated with the safe endowment reduction. The sophisticated subjects maximize the following problem for T2:

\[
\max AEET(\text{T2}) = -\delta_r w^+(0.5)[u^r(90) - u^r(90 - y)] + w^+(0.5)u^r(90 - 2y/3) \nonumber \\
+ [1 - w^+(0.5)]u^s(y/3) \quad (2)
\]

Giving up safe amounts (T1) can invoke a stronger endowment effect than giving up risky (lottery) amounts (T2), i.e. $\delta_s \geq \delta_r \geq 0$. We test this.
Sampling and implementation

1. Part of a study of rural youth business groups in Ethiopia
2. Respondents are resource-poor rural youth with limited education (median = 6 years completed education)
3. They have been provided an opportunity to establish a joint business by being provided a communal land area
4. Establish themselves as primary cooperatives with a board of five members and their own bylaw
5. Average group size: 20, about 1/3 are females
6. Develop a business plan that has to be accepted by the local authorities
7. Subject to auditing
Treatment T1 was used in a baseline survey in 2016 for a sample of 1138 business group members in 119 groups in five districts in Tigray region of Ethiopia.

The initial endowment was 30 ETB and was equivalent to a daily wage rate in these rural areas.

The amount was split in two 10 ETB and two 5 ETB notes.

Allowing investment levels of 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 ETB.

This allowed us to avoid the use of coins in the experiment.
Pilot study

1. Treatments T2 and T3 were implemented as a pilot study in one district in January 2019.
2. Treatments T2 and T3 were randomly allocated to groups within the pilot district.
4. This sample to a large extent overlapped with the 2016 sample in this district.

Based on the results in the pilot, treatment T3 was scaled up to a much larger sample covering four districts (Full sample: N=2184).

This implies a mix between a within-subject design with time delay confounded with treatment T1 versus treatments T2 and T3 and a between-subject design.
Treatments T2 and T3 were implemented as a pilot study in one district in January 2019.

Treatments T2 and T3 were randomly allocated to groups within the pilot district.

Member samples: Treatment T2: N=243, Treatment T3: N=304.

This sample to a large extent overlapped with the 2016 sample in this district.

Based on the results in the pilot, treatment T3 was scaled up to a much larger sample covering four districts (Full sample: N=2184).

This implies a mix between a within-subject design with time delay confounded with treatment T1 versus treatments T2 and T3 and a between-subject design.
We use the share invested from the maximum safe amount as dependent variable \( r = \frac{x}{X} \) and \( 0 \leq r \leq 1 \).

We used Wilcoxon rank sum tests, also called Mann-Whitney tests, to compare the distributions of this risk-share \( (r) \) variable across treatments.

We also assessed the shares of the samples for each treatment with \( r = 1 \).

We used Chi-square tests to compare the frequency of full investments across the treatment samples.
General estimation model

\[ r_{gi} = r_1 + \alpha_2 T_{1g} + \alpha_3 T_{2g} + \alpha_4 D_d + \alpha_5 E_d + \alpha_{gs} s_{gi} + g_g + \epsilon_{gi} \quad (3) \]

where subscript \( g \) represents group, subscript \( i \) represents individual, 
\( r_1 \) represents the estimated share invested in the baseline treatment (T3), 
\( \alpha_2 \) captures the treatment effect for treatment T1 as the mark-up share invested in the risky lottery, 
\( \alpha_3 \) represents the treatment effect for treatment T2 as the mark-up share invested in the risky lottery, 
\( D_d \) represents a vector of district dummy variables, 
\( E_d \) represents a vector of enumerator dummy variables, 
\( s_{gi} \) represents a set of individual characteristics (sex, age, birth rank, education), 
\( g_g \) represents group random effects, and \( \epsilon_{gi} \) the error term.
A parsimonious model that only included the treatment dummies and the district and enumerator fixed effects on the full sample.

A full sample model with additional individual controls.

A model for the sample using the same enumerators in 2016 and 2019, with additional controls.

A model for the pilot district combining 2016 and 2019 data with group random effects.

As 4) but with group fixed effects.

As 4) but with individual fixed effects.
Full sample comparison of treatments

Risk Investment Game: Alternative treatments
Safe Base: N=1138, Full Risk: N=243, Binary: N=2184

Proportion

Amount invested out of 30 ETB

Safe Base  |  Full Risk Base  |  Binary

Stein T. Holden and Mesfin Tilahun
## Average Treatment Effects in Full Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St.err.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>T1</strong></td>
<td>Average share invested</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Base</td>
<td>Share invest Full amount</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T2</strong></td>
<td>Average share invested</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Risk</td>
<td>Share invest Full amount</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T3</strong></td>
<td>Average share invested</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary</td>
<td>Share invest Full amount</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Wilcoxon ranksum Tests of Treatment effects

### Full sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>z-score</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1 vs. T2</td>
<td>-10.965</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 vs. T3</td>
<td>5.744</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 vs. T3</td>
<td>-10.487</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pilot district sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>z-score</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1 vs. T2</td>
<td>-9.078</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 vs. T3</td>
<td>2.770</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 vs. T3</td>
<td>-6.448</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Full sample and same enumerator models with controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>Same enumerators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1.treatment</td>
<td>-0.096***</td>
<td>-0.101***</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2.treatment</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>0.054***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of member</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth rank</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, years</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.472***</td>
<td>0.415***</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td>1,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of youth groups</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All models with district FE, enumerator FE and group RE

Stein T. Holden and Mesfin Tilahun How Large is the Endowment Effect in the Risky Investment Game?
### Robustness checks for the pilot district sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Group RE</th>
<th>(2) Group FE</th>
<th>(3) Individual FE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1.treatment</td>
<td>-0.105*** (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.102*** (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.114* (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2.treatment</td>
<td>0.081*** (0.029)</td>
<td>0.095** (0.047)</td>
<td>0.060 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.533*** (0.045)</td>
<td>0.532*** (0.043)</td>
<td>0.550*** (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find significant endowment effects for safe and risky initial monetary endowments provided in the game.
- We find significant endowment effects for safe and risky initial monetary endowments provided in the game.
- The endowment effect was only slightly smaller for risky than safe initial monetary endowments in some of the specifications.
We find significant endowment effects for safe and risky initial monetary endowments provided in the game.

The endowment effect was only slightly smaller for risky than safe initial monetary endowments in some of the specifications.

It is common in many types of games (e.g. trust games, dictator games, public goods games) to provide an initial monetary endowment without this being associated with a potential endowment effect, only a wealth effect: This may imply that there are endowment effects in such games but more research is needed to assess the external validity of our finding to other contexts and other types of games.
Predictions based on Alternative Theory model

- Treatment T3: No endowment effect:
- A CRRA utility function with no asset integration

Limited or no asset integration and very concave utility (high risk aversion) is needed as a sole explanation for the observed pattern if loss aversion does not play a role.

A moderately concave utility function, no or limited asset integration and weak loss aversion may be a more plausible explanation for the observed investment patterns.

A moderate utility cost for safe and risky amounts “given up” is sufficient to explain the treatment effects and dominance of interior choices ($\delta_s = \delta_r = 0$). (Figure with alternative CRRA values)
Predictions based on Alternative Theory model

- Treatment T3: No endowment effect:
- A CRRA utility function with no asset integration
- Limited or no asset integration and very concave utility (high risk aversion) is needed as a sole explanation for the observed pattern if loss aversion does not play a role

A moderately concave utility function, no or limited asset integration and weak loss aversion may be a more plausible explanation for the observed investment patterns. A moderate utility cost for safe and risky amounts "given up" is sufficient to explain the treatment effects and dominance of interior choices ($\delta_s = \delta_r = 0.1$, (Figure with alternative CRRA-r values))
Predictions based on Alternative Theory model

- Treatment T3: No endowment effect:
  - A CRRA utility function with no asset integration
  - Limited or no asset integration and very concave utility (high risk aversion) is needed as a sole explanation for the observed pattern if loss aversion does not play a role
  - A moderately concave utility function, no or limited asset integration and weak loss aversion may be a more plausible explanation for the observed investment patterns

Stein T. Holden and Mesfin Tilahun

How Large is the Endowment Effect in the Risky Investment Game?
Predictions based on Alternative Theory model

- Treatment T3: No endowment effect:
  - A CRRA utility function with no asset integration
  - Limited or no asset integration and very concave utility (high risk aversion) is needed as a sole explanation for the observed pattern if loss aversion does not play a role
  - A moderately concave utility function, no or limited asset integration and weak loss aversion may be a more plausible explanation for the observed investment patterns
  - A moderate utility cost for safe and risky amounts "given up" is sufficient to explain the treatment effects and dominance of interior choices ($\delta_s = \delta_r = 0.1$), (Figure with alternative CRRA-r values)

Stein T. Holden and Mesfin Tilahun
How Large is the Endowment Effect in the Risky Investment Game?
Alternative Endowment Effect Theory: Optimal investment level by treatment and CRRA-r, with δ=0.1
Conclusions

- We find evidence of strong endowment effects for monetary endowments both for safe and risky initial amounts provided in the game.

- We also found that interior choices dominated in all three treatments in the game while Prospect Theory, based on the diminishing sensitivity around the reference point assumption, predicts “all or nothing” choices in the game.

- We have proposed an alternative theory with concave utility and reference point dependence that better predicts the observed pattern in the game.

- We recommend more research on endowment effects associated with monetary endowments provided in experiments as such endowment/starting point effects can bias estimated preference parameters.